On Explanation: Aristotelean and Hempelean :: History Science Scientific Papers

On Explanation Aristotelean and HempeleanABSTRACT Given the big historical distance amidst scientific explanation as Aristotle and Hempel dictuming machine it, I examine and appraise important similarities and differences between the two approaches, particularly the inclination to take deduction itself as the very model of scientific knowledge. I argue that we have good reasons to reject this inclination. In his novel studies showing Galileos knowledge of and adherence to the deductive standards of explanation in comprehension set forth by Aristotle, Wallace (1) remarks that this Aristotelean theory must not be confused with the contemporary deductive-nomological theory of Hempel and Oppenheim. (2) There be, of course, important differences between the classic works of Aristotle and Hempel, for twenty-three centuries lie between them. But the differences are not as great as might be expected, and, as current discussions of the metatheoretical issues of explanation are general ly ahistorical, I believe an test to compare these two intellectual mileposts in our understanding of scientific musical arrangement should prove useful.The most obvious and interesting similarities between the two metatheories of accomplishment lie in their deductive character, and this is where their significant contrasts lie as well. Aristotle had true two major deductive systems the hypothetical and level syllogisms. Of these, he scene only the latter suitable to the demanding rigors of scientific knowledge, whose first characteristics he saw to be certainty and necessity. (3) There are some problematic elements in nevertheless what Aristotle took these concepts to mean, but I postpone discussion of that to a later stage.The categorical syllogism, preferably in the familiar Barbara of the first figure of the first mood, Aristotle sees to be the ideal supplier of both the certainty and the necessity, with the scientific cobblers last world the conclusion of the syllogis m. Like Hempel and Oppenheim, he insists that the premises be true, from which it is evident that the conclusion could not fail to be certainly and necessarily true. The syllogism itself, as an argument, and so stands as an explanation. Inasmuch as the deductive system of the categorical syllogism can be seen now to be a significant subset of the first-order predicate calculus, which is the deductive system prescribed by Hempel and Oppenheim, the difference between the deductive requirements of the two metatheories is actually only that of the greater scope, power, and elegance of the more recent logic. But it remained for Hempel and Oppenheim to rouse out the